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INTRODUCTION

The availability of the secured debt expense1 to debtors intending to
surrender collateral as part of their chapter 7 bankruptcy case is a heavily
debated question that has sharply divided bankruptcy courts since the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA) in 2005.2 The question is a straightforward one: When
completing the means test calculation, may a consumer debtor deduct
payments due for secured debts on the petition date if the debtor intends
to surrender or has surrendered the collateral securing the underlying
obligation.3
Traditionally, a majority of the courts considering the question have
allowed the deduction in chapter 7 cases irrespective of the debtor’s plans
for the collateral post-petition; a minority of bankruptcy courts interpret
the expense using a “future oriented” or “forward-looking” approach.4
Courts using the latter approach deny the chapter 7 debtor the benefit of
the expense if the debtor intends to surrender the collateral and, therefore,
will not in reality be making payments on the obligation post-petition.5 On
the heels of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamilton v.

1
The phrase “secured debt expense” or “secured debt deduction” refers to 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (West 2018).
2
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.);
see infra Part III.
3
See generally Mark Goldman, Leading Lawyers on Preparing a Chapter 7 Filing,
Establishing Effective Client Strategies, and Understanding Recent Trends, 2010 WL
1976163, at *7-8 (2010).
4
In re White, 512 B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014) (recognizing the split in authority
and summarizing the conflicting “snapshot” and “future oriented” approaches applied by
the bankruptcy courts when interpreting section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code); In re
Rivers, 466 B.R. 558 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[P]rior to 2010, the vast majority of courts
to consider this issue [] concluded that the plain language of the statute permits a Chapter
7 debtor to deduct payments on secured debt even when the debtor plans to surrender postpetition the collateral underlying the debt.”); In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
2007) (stating that, since the implementation of BAPCPA, two distinctive lines of cases
have emerged as courts struggle with the issue of whether to allow a debtor to deduct
secured debt payments for collateral that will be surrendered).
5
In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 471
B.R. 540, 551 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Krawczyk, No. 11-09596-8-JRL, 2012 WL
3069437, at *3-5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 27, 2012).
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Lanning6 and Ransom v. FIA Card Services,7 however, a new trend has
emerged.8 Spurred by the Court’s dicta in these two decisions, a growing
number of bankruptcy courts have begun to apply the forward-looking
approach to deny debtors the benefit of this allowance in chapter 7
consumer liquidation cases.9
In sharp contrast to earlier cases where bankruptcy courts focused on
determining the applicability of the secured debt expense by focusing on
the Code’s language, the newer cases that are representative of this trend
notably lack analysis of the statutory text.10 Instead, courts are willing to
bypass the language of the statute or discernment of its plain meaning in
favor of an interpretation that will, in their opinion, best conform to the
“spirit” of BAPCPA.11 Underlying the trend is the assumption that
Congress made a mistake by drafting language into the means test that
essentially allows debtors to pull one over on creditors: this language
permits the consumer debtor to deduct phantom expenses that artificially
decrease the amount of debtor’s disposable income and, thereby, allow the
debtor to escape his financial obligations through a chapter 7 bankruptcy
case.12 According to these courts, this amounts to a free pass, permitting
the debtor to continue his chapter 7 case without getting caught by the
means test’s presumption of abuse.13 To fix this and inject a much needed
dose of realism into the chapter 7 means test, these courts posit that the
expense must be given a forward-looking interpretation that focuses on
whether the debtor will incur the expense post-petition and, therefore,
allows the deduction from CMI only when the debtor reaffirms the
obligation that is secured by the collateral.14
But, while this approach may seem more in line with the broad
purposes underlying BAPCPA, it is not supported by the statute’s
language or the larger context of the chapter 7 dismissal statute.15 More
importantly, this trend has far reaching consequences for consumer
debtors that raise concerns of equity and fairness. In chapter 7 cases where
a debtor fails the means test as a result of being denied the use of the
expense, this interpretation of the statute imposes an onerous and unfair
6

Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 508-09 (2010).
Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., 562 U.S. 61, 65 (2011).
8
Id.; see also infra Part II(C).
9
See infra Part III.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Christopher W. Frost, Nagging Problems under BAPCPA post Lanning and Ransom,
32 No. 11 Bankruptcy Law Letter 1 (Nov. 2012).
13
In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 555 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Thompson, 457 B.R.
872, 880 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
14
See infra Part III.
15
See infra Part III.
7
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burden on the debtor who will have to disprove abuse in order to continue
his chapter 7 case.16 Conversely, this approach allows the bankruptcy
trustee to benefit from an initial presumption of abuse without having to
meet the evidentiary burden of proving abuse through the totality of
circumstances or bad faith tests.17 Such an absurd result cannot be what
Congress intended when it created three separate and distinct tests in
section 707(b)(2) for determining whether the dismissal of debtor’s
chapter 7 case for abuse is proper.
This new approach also raises a broader question regarding the use of
judicial discretion after BAPCPA and whether bankruptcy courts should
go beyond the statutory text, or bypass it completely, to fix what the courts
perceive to be a broken means test – one that produces results that do not
align with the courts’ interpretation of the test’s purpose. A careful
analysis of the cases using this approach show that attempts to fix the
perceived accuracy of the means test calculation through piecemeal
judicial interpretation of its parts, creates a much larger problem and one
that may ultimately jeopardize debtors’ ability to obtain bankruptcy
relief.18
This article examines the growing trend among bankruptcy courts to
selectively adopt a new kind of forward-looking approach when
determining the applicability of the secured debt expense to a chapter 7
case and the negative effects of this growing trend on consumer debtors.
Part II of this article discusses the key distinctions between chapter 7 and
chapter 13 bankruptcy cases and how those differences must inform the
interpretation to be given by the bankruptcy courts to the secured debt
expense statute, section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the bankruptcy code. This
section also analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Hamilton v. Lanning and Ransom v. FIA Card Services, the two cases to
spark the trend toward a future-oriented or forward-looking means test in
chapter 7 consumer cases. Part III begins by discussing what has been
labeled the “majority approach,” an approach focused on discerning the
plain meaning of the statutory language in section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), as
well as the significance of that language in the broader context of the
means test, including the purpose and effect of the other dismissal tests in
section 707(b)(3) of the bankruptcy code. Part III then analyzes the most
recent bankruptcy decisions interpreting the secured debt expense after the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lanning and Ransom, or what
is referred to throughout this article as the “trend cases.” It argues that a
textual and contextual analysis of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) supports the
16
17
18

11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2018).
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (West 2018).
See infra Part III.
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conclusion that means testing in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases is
incompatible with the forward-looking approach being increasingly
adopted by bankruptcy courts. Finally, part IV of this article discusses the
negative effects of a means test that, although designed by Congress to be
mechanical in its application, is interpreted to selectively incorporate one
forward-looking element. It concludes that a mechanical means test with
one select forward-looking element is inequitable and imposes a
significant if not insurmountable evidentiary burden on the debtor when
that element results in a presumption of abuse being triggered. This forces
the debtor to make an initial show of proof that he deserves a fresh start –
an approach at odds with the statutory text, inconsistent with the purposes
underlying means testing, and contrary to longstanding bankruptcy policy.

II. THE MEANS TEST IN CHAPTER 7 AND CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY
CASES: COMPARING APPLES AND ORANGES
The means test is a mathematical calculation that in chapter 7
bankruptcy cases may trigger a presumption that the case is an abuse of
the bankruptcy laws.19 As codified in section 707(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the means test is merely the first of three distinct
methods through which the United States Trustee or other party in interest
may prove “abuse” of the bankruptcy laws by the debtor and, accordingly,
seek to have debtor’s chapter 7 case dismissed.20 This calculation is used
to assess the debtor’s income and expenses, allowing the bankruptcy court
to easily determine whether the debtor should be eligible for chapter 7
relief based strictly on the numbers.21 As such, the means test has been
described as nothing more than a screening mechanism or objective litmus
test to be applied as of the petition date to determine whether a chapter 7
proceeding is appropriate.22
The starting point for the means test calculation is debtor’s “current
monthly income,” or CMI, a monetary amount that is determined by
19

11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (West 2018).
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2) (West 2018); § 707(b)(3) (West 2018); see also In re Rivers,
466 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he means test is only the first step of a
two-tiered inquiry under section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
21
In re Castillo, No. 08-10878-PGH, 2008 WL 4544467, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct.
10, 2008).
22
In re White, 512 B.R. 822, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014) (noting that the means test
is intended to determine the debtor’s eligibility for chapter 7 relief as of the petition date);
In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he Means Test serves as a
‘screening mechanism to determine whether a Chapter 7 proceeding is appropriate’”); see
generally Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81
AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 477 (2007).
20
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looking retrospectively at the debtor’s income from all sources during the
six months preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case.23 From that
amount, the debtor may deduct certain monthly expenses; the type of
expense a debtor may claim and its specific amount is set forth by statute.24
Most of these expenses are based on National or Local Standards and, as
such are applied uniformly throughout the geographic regions to which the
expense is applicable.25 With very few exceptions, these expense
allowances will not accurately represent debtor’s actual or current
expenses.26 When the result of this calculation, the debtor’s disposable
income, is above the statutory threshold set in section 707(b)(2)(A)(i) of
the bankruptcy code, the debtor fails the means test and the case is
presumed to be an abuse of the bankruptcy laws and must be dismissed.27
The secured debt expense, found in section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the
bankruptcy code, allows a debtor to subtract from his CMI an amount
equal to the monthly payments contractually due to secured creditors in
the sixty months following the petition date.28 Its effect is to decrease a
debtor’s disposable income and, thereby, make it more likely that this
amount will not trigger a presumption of abuse.29 In some consumer cases,
the secured debt expense may be the sole expense that keeps a debtor
below the statutory threshold that will trigger a presumption of abuse.30 In
other cases, it may be the single largest allowance to reduce the debtor’s
CMI on the means test calculation. Irrespective, where this expense allows
a debtor to pass the means test, the case will still be subject to dismissal
for abuse upon a showing that the debtor filed the chapter 7 case in bad

23

11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (West 2018); § 101(10A) (West 2018);
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(V); (iii); (iv).
25
Id.
26
In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 562 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he bulk of the allowable
deductions are fixed amounts, based upon the IRS National Standards and Local Standards,
not based on a debtor’s actual expenses . . . .”); In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 868 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Castillo, No. 08-10878-PGH, 2008 WL 4544467, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. Oct. 10, 2008).
27
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II) (“In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of
relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall presume abuse
exists if the debtor’s current monthly income reduced by the amounts determined under
clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of 25 percent of
the debtor’s non-priority unsecured claims in the case, or $7,700, whichever is greater; or
$12,850.”).
28
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
29
Id.
30
See generally In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re
Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131, 136 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 555
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012).
24
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faith or that a totality of circumstances proves that debtor can afford to pay
at least some of his outstanding debts.31
When it enacted BAPCPA, Congress chose to incorporate the means
test calculation into both chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases, giving the
calculation a unique role in each chapter.32 Accordingly, given the
different types of bankruptcy relief offered by each chapter and their
different policy objectives, the secured debt expense must be understood
within the broader context of the means test itself and its unique function
in chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases respectively.33

A. The Need for a Reality Based Means Test in Chapter 13 Cases.
In chapter 7 consumer cases a debtor’s non-exempt assets are
liquidated to pay unsecured creditors and the debtor is discharged from his
personal liability on these claims. Accordingly, a debtor’s post-petition
earnings are wholly his own and part of debtor’s bankruptcy “fresh start.”
In these cases, the means test functions as a kind of gatekeeper that
ultimately determines whether an above-median debtor is eligible for this
extraordinary remedy.
Although, in theory, the amount yielded by the means test calculation
is what the debtor could presumably pay to creditors over the life of a
hypothetical five-year Chapter 13 Plan, in reality, the figure is unlikely to
31

§ 707(b)(3) (West 2018) (“In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of
relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter in a case in which the presumption
in paragraph (2)(A)(i) does not arise or is rebutted, the court shall consider – (A) whether
the debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or (B) the totality of circumstances . . . of the
debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.”).
32
Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65 n.1 (“Chapter 13 borrows the means test from Chapter 7,
where it is used as a screening mechanism to determine whether a Chapter 7 proceeding is
appropriate.”); In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 566 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (noting that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of the means test in chapter
13 cases differs significantly from its purpose in chapter 7 cases); In re Ralston, 400 B.R.
854, 856 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Radically different purpose of ‘means test’ as applied
in chapter 7 as mechanical test of whether bankruptcy petition is presumptively
abusive . . . .”).
33
See In re Denzin, 534 B.R. 883, 887 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015) (“The chapter 7 means
test in § 707(b)(2) and the chapter 13 means test in § 1325(b) do not necessarily result in
the same amount. This is understandable because they serve two different purposes, one to
guard the door to chapter 7 relief and the other to determine how much should be paid to
creditors in chapter 13.”); see also In re Grinkmeyer, 456 B.R. 385, 388-89 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 2011) (emphasizing that the chapter 13 means test, used to determine the debtor’s
projected disposable income, and the chapter 7 means test, used to determine if a
presumption of abuse arises in chapter 7 cases, are based on distinctly different
considerations); In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905, 910 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (stating
that a “distinct analysis” of the means test must be undertaken in chapter 7 and chapter 13
cases because there are different considerations with respect to how issues arising under
these respective chapters are handled).
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accurately reflect debtor’s actual repayment capacity. By congressional
design the calculation does not use the debtor’s actual or “real” income or
expenses.34 The income portion of the calculation is strictly backward
looking; probable or actual increases in the debtor’s income post-petition
are not calculated into debtor’s CMI in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases.35 The
type and amount of allowable expenses, with very few exceptions, is
statutorily prescribed.36 Even if a debtor’s actual expenses exceed the
amounts allowed by the statute, the debtor may claim an allowance only
for the specified sum rather than for the debtor’s real expenditures.37 As
with the income portion of the calculation, post-petition fluctuations in
debtor’s expenses are not considered.38 Accordingly, although Congress

34
In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. at 910 (“Congress chose to base the means test on
historic income and expense figures that are in effect on the petition date, as opposed to
figures that may change with the passage of time or with a change in debtor’s lifestyle.”);
In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012) (“The statute sets allowable
expenses by means of several different methods, and, like section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), many
other provisions of the means test appear to operate contrary to the goal of accurately
determining the amount of income that would actually be available for payments to
unsecured creditors in a Chapter 13 case.”); Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial
Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 477 (2007).
35
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A); In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595, 602 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2007); see also In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 317 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (“Calculations under
the means test are purposefully circumscribed and should not include foreseeable
circumstances . . . .”); In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125, at *6 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006); In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 465 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
36
11 U.S.C.A § 707(b)(2)(A) (West 2018).
37
In fact, in chapter 7 cases, the statute allows the court to consider the debtor’s real
income and expenses, or post-petition fluctuations in debtor’s income and expenses, only
when the debtor seeks to rebut the presumption of abuse that results after the debtor “fails”
the means test by establishing “special circumstances.” Even then, the debtor must first
prove that “special circumstances” warrant a downward or upward adjustment of the
statutorily prescribed income and expense figures respectively–an evidentiary burden that
is exceedingly difficult for a debtor to prove in most jurisdictions. Additionally, the debtor
must then show that, once the income and expense figures are adjusted, debtor’s disposable
income falls below the statutory threshold that will trigger the presumption of abuse and
that, therefore, debtor “passes” the means test due to his “special circumstances.” In re
Prestwood, 451 B.R. 180, 184 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2011).
38
See In re Haman, 366 B.R. at 317 (noting that, instead, such future circumstances are
properly considered under the totality analysis of section 707(b)(3)); see In re Hartwick,
359 B.R. 16, 21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (“Congress did not remove the ability of bankruptcy
courts to consider circumstances including postpetition developments, in determining
abuse. On the contrary, Congress expressly incorporated the formerly judicially created
totality of the circumstances test which permits consideration of circumstances both
preceding and following the filing of the petition.”); In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 465
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (The impact of postpetition events are not part of the means test.
If the UST wishes the bankruptcy court to consider post-petition events, she may not rely
on a presumption of abuse under the means test, but must bring her motion to dismiss under
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sought to create a uniform test that would identify abuse of the bankruptcy
process using a straightforward mathematical calculation that would be
applied equally to all consumer debtors, the very nature of the calculation
and the uniformity of its components militates against the means test being
able to function as an accurate realistic measure of debtor’s actual
repayment capacity. As such, the means test is mechanical, based only
superficially on debtor’s financial reality, and merely creates a bright line
presumptive test of eligibility for chapter 7 relief that is to be applied as of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition.39 In In re Henebury, for example, the
court noted: “[T]he means test presents a backward looking litmus test
performed using mathematical computations of arbitrary numbers, often
having little to do with a particular debtor’s actual circumstances and
ability to pay a portion of debt.”40 At best, in chapter 7 cases, the means
test can provide only a limited approximation of debtor’s disposable
income.
Accordingly, in chapter 7 cases, Congress designed section 707(b) so
as to create a two-part abuse analysis.41 Part one, the means test
calculation, is mechanical and designed to look backwards at the state of
debtor’s financial affairs as of the petition date.42 Part two, codified in
section 707(b)(3), allows the court to consider debtor’s real finances,
including post-petition changes in income and expenses, to more

section 707(b)(1) or (b)(3) and satisfy the burden of proof without the benefit of any
presumption).
39
See In re Castillo, No. 08-10878-PGH, 2008 WL 4544467, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
Oct. 10, 2008); In re Henebury, 361 B.R. at 603 (“Congress has already determined the
fairness of application of the means test, and a major objective of the legislation was to
remove judicial discretion from the process.”); In re White, 512 B.R. 822, 827 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 2014) (“[T]he means test is intended to determine a debtor’s eligibility for
chapter 7 relief as of the petition date without regard to known future circumstances which
impact a debtor’s income or expenses.”); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr. S.D.
Ill. 2012) (“[T]he means test is intended to determine a debtor’s eligibility for chapter 7
relief at a specific point in time without regard to the accuracy of that determination.”).
40
In re Henebury, 361 B.R. at 603; see also In re Hartwick, 352 B.R. 867, 870 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 2006); Ned W. Waxman & Justin H. Rucki, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Abuse: Means
Testing is Presumptive, but “Totality” is Determinative, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 907 (2008)
(“[T]he means test is merely a presumption of abuse based on a snapshot at the moment of
filing of the bankruptcy petition, and it is not necessarily indicative of the debtor’s actual
financial condition.”).
41
See In re Denzin, 534 B.R. 883, 886 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015) (“If a prospective chapter
7 debtor satisfies the § 707(b)(2) means test, he must also satisfy a second test to qualify
for chapter 7, § 707(b)(3).”); In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007)
(“§ 707(b)(3) is but one of two subordinate paragraphs used to determine whether a case
should be dismissed for abuse pursuant to § 707(b)(1). The other, contained in § 707(b)(2),
sets forth a formulaic approach, known as the ‘means test’ . . . .”).
42
See In re Denzin, 534 B.R. at 886-87.
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accurately reflect debtor’s repayment capacity.43 If a debtor “fails” the
means test, it bestows on the bankruptcy trustee the benefit of a
presumption of abuse that, when triggered, requires the dismissal of
debtor’s chapter 7 case without any additional proffer of evidence of
debtor’s “abuse” by the trustee.44 By contrast, where the presumption of
abuse is not triggered because debtor “passes” the means test, the trustee
or a party in interest wanting to dismiss the debtor’s chapter 7 case for
abuse must seek dismissal under section 707(b)(3) and prove that a totality
of circumstances shows that debtor’s chapter 7 case is an abuse of the
bankruptcy laws or that the debtor filed his petition in bad faith.45
An analysis of section 707(b) show that a forward-looking
interpretation of the secured debt expense is inconsistent with the function,
context, and purpose of the means test calculation in chapter 7 bankruptcy
cases as such an interpretation effectively allows bankruptcy courts to
pluck one allowable expense from the broader context of the means test
calculation and single it out for special treatment–making it the only part
of the means test calculation in a chapter 7 case selectively interpreted by
the court to reflect post-petition changes to the debtor’s expenses.46 By
extension, such an interpretation of the secured debt expense ignores the
purpose and function of section 707(b)(3), a provision specifically added
by Congress to the dismissal statute to give bankruptcy courts some
discretion to assess debtor’s real financial circumstances in cases where
43
See In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 561 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“§ 707(b) provides a
two-step process to detect and deter abusive filers: the . . . objective means test prescribed
in § 707(b)(2), and the more subjective test of [section] 707(b)(3) which requires an
analysis of the facts of a particular case.”); In re Denzin, 534 B.R. at 886-87.
44
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2); In re Ervin, No. 15-70467, 2016 WL 721043, at *7 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2016) (noting that BAPCPA expressly provides that, after a presumption
of abuse has been established under section 707(b)(2), the burden of persuasion shifts to
the debtor to demonstrate special circumstances to rebut the presumption); In re Walker,
No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006) (“In cases
in which the presumption of abuse does not arise or is rebutted, the U.S. Trustee may pursue
dismissal of a debtor’s case under section 707(b)(3).”).
45
In re Haar, 373 B.R. at 495; In re Perrotta, 390 B.R. 26, 31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008); In
re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012) (noting that a mechanical application
of the means test is consistent with Congress’s intent to limit the bankruptcy court’s
discretion and that the certainty of this approach over an “actual circumstances evaluation”
in chapter 7 cases complements the totality of circumstances inquiry prescribed by section
707(b)(2)(B) which remains the backup option when the trustee is dissatisfied with the
results of the means test); In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 173 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); see
generally Ned W. Waxman & Justin H. Rucki, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Abuse: Means
Testing is Presumptive, but ‘Totality’ is Determinative, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 905 (2008)
(recognizing that the proper role of the means test in chapter 7 is simply as a mechanism
for generating a presumption; it does not result in any final determination).
46
See In re Rivers, 466 B.R. at 563; In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 316-18 (Bankr. D. Del.
2007); In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905, 911 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
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the debtor passes the means test or where the presumption of abuse is not
triggered.47
In sharp contrast to the means test’s function as a bright line test of
eligibility in chapter 7 cases, in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases the
calculation must allow the bankruptcy court to accurately determine,
rather than merely approximate, the amount of debtor’s post-petition
disposable income that can feasibly be paid to unsecured creditors over the
life of the Chapter 13 Plan.48 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code enables
an individual debtor to obtain a discharge of their debts if the debtor pays
his creditors a portion of his monthly income in accordance with a courtapproved debt repayment plan that lasts three to five years post-petition.49
As a rule, the funding for creditor repayment is based on the debtor’s
anticipated future earnings.50 To determine how much of his future
earnings the debtor must commit to paying unsecured creditors under the
plan, section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code borrows the chapter 7 means
test statutory formula.51 In chapter 13 cases, however, the mathematical
calculation of CMI minus allowable expenses is used to yield the debtor’s
“projected disposable income,” or the amount that an above-median debtor
must devote to reimbursing creditors under the plan.52 Although the
Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “projected disposable income,”
it defines “disposable income” as “current monthly income received by
the debtor . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” for the
debtor’s maintenance or support.53 For above-median debtors the
“amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” for debtor’s maintenance
47
See In re Rivers, 466 B.R. at 563; In re Perelman, 419 B.R. at 173; In re Perrotta, 390
B.R. at 31; In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16, 21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007).
48
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)-(3) (West 2018); see generally In re Johnson, 503 B.R.
447, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) (“[t]here is a significant difference between chapter 13,
where the goal is to pay creditors out of projected disposable income, and chapter 7, where
the goal is liquidation and discharge and the court is not required to project debtor’s future
resources.”).
49
See 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (2018) et seq.; section 1306 (2018); Hamilton v. Lanning, 560
U.S. at 508-09 (“Unlike debtors who file for chapter 7 and must liquidate their nonexempt
assets in order to pay creditors, Chapter 13 debtors are permitted to keep their property, but
they must agree to a court-approved plan under which they pay creditors out of future
income . . . .”).
50
11 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1)-(3); Richard S. Stolker, The Means Test in Chapter 13 After
Hamilton v. Lanning and Johnson v. Zimmer, MD. B.J., January/February 12, 2013.
51
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)-(3).
52
In a chapter 13 case, if the trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to the confirmation
of the debt repayment plan, the debtor must commit of all debtor’s “projected disposable
income” to paying unsecured creditors over the life of the plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b)(1)(B)(2)(2016). The term “projected disposable income” is undefined in the
Code § 1325(b)(1)(B)-(3); see also Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 509.
53
§ 1325(b)(3).
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and support is calculated by using the means test calculation.54 Notably,
section 1325 borrows only the means test calculation itself and does not
incorporate into chapter 13 either of the alternative abuse tests in section
707(b)(3) which, in chapter 7 cases, allow the bankruptcy court to consider
post-petition fluctuations in income and expenses that impact debtor’s
repayment capacity.55
Often referred to as a “living chapter,” bankruptcy courts have
recognized that a Chapter 13 debtor’s circumstances are constantly
changing and evolving such that, throughout the life of a Chapter 13 Plan,
it is often amended to reflect post-petition changes in the debtor’s financial
circumstances.56 Because a Chapter 13 Plan requires that creditors be
repaid using debtor’s actual future earnings, rather than some approximate
estimation based on debtor’s pre-petition historical income, the United
States Supreme Court has held that a forward-looking approach is
appropriate in some cases for the purpose of determining debtor’s
“projected disposable income.”57 This approach, as described by the Court
in the Lanning and Ransom cases, makes sense given that, in chapter 13
bankruptcy cases, section 707(b)(3) does not apply and, therefore, cannot
function to allow a bankruptcy court to consider how post-petition
fluctuations in debtor’s income or expenses will affect his repayment
capacity.58 Accordingly, in those cases, post-petition changes to debtor’s
finances can only be considered or accounted for by modifying the amount
of debtor’s disposable income, so as to reflect the changes, or by
modifying the Chapter 13 Plan itself after its confirmation. Even in chapter
13 cases, however, the Court has emphasized that the mechanical approach
is the proper starting point for determining disposable income using the
means test calculation.59 Only when there are changes to debtor’s income
54

Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv); see also Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65 (noting that this
test supplanted the pre-BAPCPA practice of calculating debtors’ reasonable expenses on a
case-by-case basis, which led to varying and often inconsistent determinations).
55
See § 1325(b)(3).
56
In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 859 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
57
Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. at 509 (stating that, in calculating a debtor’s “projected
disposable income” in a chapter 13 case a forward-looking approach must apply).
58
Section 1325 incorporates by reference only subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section
707(b)(2)’s means test and excludes any mention of section 707(b)(3)’s alternative abuse
tests–the bad faith and totality of circumstances tests which allow a trustee to seek
dismissal of the case for abuse based on post-petition changes to debtor’s ability to pay.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (“Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph
(2) . . . shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section
707(b)(2) . . . .”).
59
See Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 519 (“[A] court taking the forward-looking approach should
begin by calculating disposable income, and in most cases, nothing more is required. It is
only in unusual cases that a court must go further and take into account other known or
virtually certain information about the debtor’s future income or expenses.”).
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or expenses that are known or virtually certain to occur at the time of
confirmation, should a dynamic or forward-looking approach be used.60
The United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Hamilton v. Lanning
and Ransom v. FIA Card Services interpret section 1325 of the Bankruptcy
Code and the function of the means test calculation for purposes of
determining the amount of payments to be made to unsecured creditors
during the life of a Chapter 13 Plan. In both of these cases, the Court
recognizes that the nature of a chapter 13 case, and its attendant repayment
to creditors through an ongoing plan of debt repayment, militate against a
strictly mechanical approach to determine disposable income and may
require bankruptcy courts to consider future changes to the debtor’s
income or expenses. 61 In neither case, however, does the Court state, or
even allude, that a forward-looking means test is appropriate in chapter 7
cases.

B. Hamilton v. Lanning: Modifying the Means Test to Accurately
Determine Debtor’s Actual Repayment Capacity in Chapter 13
Cases
In Hamilton v. Lanning, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to specifically decide how a bankruptcy court should calculate a
debtor’s “projected disposable income” in a chapter 13 case.62 The
Hamilton case presented the unique scenario of an individual debtor whose
“current monthly income” was inflated by a non-recurring payment
received by the debtor shortly before the bankruptcy filing.63 As a result
of that payment, the Debtor’s CMI did not accurately reflect debtor’s
actual post-petition earnings, the earnings that would be available to pay
creditors under the Chapter 13 Plan, which were significantly lower.64 The
debtor’s “current monthly income” was calculated as $5,343.70, well
above the state-median, and her monthly disposable income was
$1,114.98.65 In reality, since filing her bankruptcy petition, the debtor had
started a new job giving her monthly income totaling $1,922, an amount
below the state-median, and a monthly disposable income amount of

60

Id.
See id. at 520 (“In cases in which a debtor’s disposable income during the 6-month
look-back period is either substantially lower or higher than the debtor’s disposable income
during the plan period, the mechanical approach would produce senseless results . . . .”).
62
Id. at 509 (recognizing that, in determining whether to confirm a Chapter 13 Plan,
some lower courts had taken a “mechanical approach” while some had adopted a forwardlooking approach).
63
Id. at 511.
64
Id.
65
Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 511.
61
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$149.03.66 Accordingly, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 Plan that committed
$144 per month of debtor’s disposable income to paying unsecured
creditors.67
The Chapter 13 trustee objected to the confirmation of the plan
arguing that the debtor had not committed all of her projected disposable
income to the repayment of creditors.68 According to the trustee, the proper
way to calculate projected disposable income was to use a mechanical
approach and multiply the debtor’s disposable income, as calculated on
Form 22C using the means test calculation, by the number of months in
the Plan commitment period.69 Using that approach, the trustee argued, the
debtor would be able to pay the unsecured creditors in full by making
monthly plan payments of $756 for five years, the applicable commitment
period for above-median debtors.70 Given the inaccurate inflation of
debtor’s CMI due to the one-time pre-petition payment, however, the
parties agreed that the debtor’s actual monthly disposable income of
merely $149.03, was insufficient to pay that amount.71
Stating that the statutory text of section 1325 was in itself inconsistent
and contrary to the application of a strictly mechanical approach when
determining the amount of projected disposable income to be paid to
creditors over the life of a Chapter 13 Plan, the United States Supreme
Court held that a bankruptcy court may consider post-petition changes to
the debtor’s finances, such as a decrease or increase to debtor’s postpetition income or expenses, when calculating “projected disposable
income” in chapter 13 cases.72 The Court stated: “[W]e hold that when a
bankruptcy court calculates a debtor’s projected disposable income, the
court may account for changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are
known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation.”73 In so holding, the
Court relied heavily on the statutory text of section 1325 stating, first, that
in section 1325(b)(1)(B) the “reference to projected disposable income ‘to
be received in the applicable commitment period’ strongly favor[ed] [a]
forward looking approach.”74 A Chapter 13 Plan’s applicable commitment
period is necessarily forward-looking as plan payments are made by a

66

Id.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 511.
72
Id. at 517 (“The mechanical approach [] clashes repeatedly with the terms of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325.”).
73
Id. at 524.
74
Id. at 517 (quoting section 1325(b)(1)(B)).
67
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debtor for three to five years post-petition.75 Moreover, the Court noted
that the mandate in section 1325(b)(1) that courts determine projected
disposable income “as of the effective date of the plan” similarly calls for
a forward looking approach to be applied in chapter 13 cases as the
“effective date of the plan” is the date on which a plan is confirmed and
becomes binding.76 The Court noted that, because of the dynamic nature
of a chapter 13 case, employing a strictly mechanical approach in
calculating projected disposable income would produce a senseless result
not intended by Congress. That approach would deny creditors payments
that the debtor could easily make in cases where debtor’s disposable
income is higher during plan period than during the six-month lookback
period while denying Chapter 13 protection to debtors, such as the debtor
in Hamilton, where debtor’s disposable income during the plan period is
substantially lower than debtor’s income pre-petition.77

C. Ransom v. FIA Card Services: A More Realistic Measure of
Debtor’s Actual Expenses in Chapter 13 Cases
After its decision in Hamilton, the United States Supreme Court once
again had opportunity to interpret section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code in
the case of Ransom v. FIA Card Services.78 In Ransom, the Court
considered whether a chapter 13 debtor could deduct from debtor’s current
monthly income the amount allowed under the Local Standards for vehicle
ownership costs even when the debtor was not making loan or lease
payments on his vehicle.79 Specifically, the question before the Court was
how a bankruptcy court should calculate the expense for vehicle
ownership costs, when determining the amount a debtor could deduct from
75

The “applicable commitment period” for a Chapter 13 Plan is defined in section
1325(b)(4) as three years for below-median debtors or not less than five years if the
debtor’s income is above the median income for a family of similar size. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b)(4)(A)-(B).
76
Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 518 (quoting sections 1325(b)(1); 1327(a)).
77
Id. at 519 (agreeing with the United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit’s
opinion that “a court taking the forward-looking approach should begin by calculating
disposable income . . . It is only in unusual cases that a court may go further and take into
account other known or virtually certain information about the debtor’s future income or
expenses.”).
78
Ransom, 562 U.S. at 61.
79
Id. at 64. The Local Standards allow a debtor with a vehicle to claim an allowance for
certain costs of car ownership. The Transportation Expense Standards consists of two parts:
nationwide figures for monthly loan or lease payments, referred to as ownership costs, and
an additional allowance for monthly operating costs. The Operating Costs include vehicle
maintenance, fuel, repairs, insurance, fuel, registrations, licenses, inspections, parking and
tolls. The United States Department of Justice at https://www.justice.gov/ust/meanstesting/20180501 (visited on Oct. 4, 2018).
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his disposable income for “amounts reasonably necessary to be
expended.”80
The debtor proposed to pay creditors approximately 25 percent of his
unsecured debt over the life of the Chapter 13 Plan.81 FIA Card Services,
one of debtor’s unsecured creditors, objected claiming that the debtor’s
plan did not direct all of his projected disposable income to paying
unsecured claims.82 FIA argued that the debtor should not have claimed
the car-ownership allowance as an expense because debtor was not making
loan or lease payments on his car.83 FIA noted that, without this expense,
debtor’s monthly disposable income would be significantly higher,
amounting to a difference of approximately $28,000 over the life of the
plan.84
The Court held that the debtor could not take the allowance for vehicle
ownership, finding that a chapter 13 debtor could only claim a deduction
under the National or Local Standards if the debtor would incur that kind
of expense during the life of the plan.85 Because Ransom owned his car
outright, he could not take the deduction for car ownership.86
The Court focused first on the statutory language of section
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code.87 It states: “The debtor’s
monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense
amounts specified under the National Standards and Local
Standard . . . .”88 The key word in this phrase according to the Court is
“applicable” as it was added by Congress to act as a filter separating
debtors who qualify for an allowance from those debtors that do not.89 An
expense is “applicable” within the plain meaning of the statute when the
expense is appropriate or relevant, as is the case when a debtor has costs
corresponding to that category.90 The Court noted that because, in section
1325, Congress incorporated the means test into chapter 13 in order to
approximate an above-median debtor’s reasonable expenditures on
80

Ransom, 562 U.S. at 64 (“This case concerns the specified expense for vehicle
ownership costs. We must determine whether a debtor . . . who owns a car outright, and so
does not make loan or lease payments, may claim an allowance for car-ownership costs
(thereby reducing the amount he will repay creditors).”).
81
Id. at 67 (noting that Ransom proposed a five-year plan that would have resulted in
repayment of approximately 25% of his unsecured debt).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 64.
86
Ransom, 562 U.S. at 73.
87
Id. at 65-66.
88
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(b)(1)(B) and (b)(4).
89
Ransom, 562 U.S. at 69-70.
90
Id.

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

197

essential items, for purposes of determining the amount to be paid to
unsecured creditors under the plan, a debtor should be required to qualify
for an expense by incurring an expense in the relevant category.91
According to the Court: “If Congress had not wanted to separate in this
way debtors who qualify for an allowance from those that do not, it could
have omitted the term ‘applicable’ altogether. Without that word, all
debtors would be eligible to claim a deduction for each category listed in
the Standards. Congress presumably included ‘applicable’ to achieve a
different result.”92

III. THE MEANS TEST AND THE SECURED DEBT EXPENSE: AN
EXERCISE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
To determine whether a debtor may deduct the secured debt expense
on his chapter 7 means test when the debtor intends to surrender the
collateral, a court must begin by examining the text of section
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) to arrive at its plain meaning.93 When the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the court–at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd–is to enforce it according to
its terms.94 The United States Supreme Court has stated that the plainness
or ambiguity of statutory text is determined by reference to the language
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole.95 Where the statutory language is not
ambiguous, there is generally no need for a court to inquire beyond the
plain language of the statute.96

91

See id. at 65. The term “projected disposable income” is undefined in the Code, but
the term “disposable income” is defined as “current monthly income received by the
debtor . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended[.]” § 1325(b)(1)(B)-(3). For
above-median debtors the “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” is calculated by
using the means test. §§ 1325(b)(3); 707(b)(2)(A)-(B); see also Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 509.
92
Id. at 70.
93
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“It
is well settled that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute
itself.”); Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); Ransom, 562 U.S. at
69 (“Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code starts where all such inquiries must begin, with
the language of the statute itself.”).
94
Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (stating that the plain meaning of the statute is conclusive
unless literal application of the statute will produce a result “demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of the drafters”).
95
Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242.
96
In re American Steel Product, Inc., 197 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 1999).
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A. The Secured Debt Expense in Chapter 7 Cases: Plain Meaning
and Congressional Intent
Section 707(b)(2)(A) provides that, in considering whether the
granting of bankruptcy relief would constitute abuse, the court shall
presume that abuse exists “if the debtor’s current monthly income reduced
by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv)” yields a
monetary amount that is above the monetary threshold set by the statute.97
Sub-section (ii) allows a debtor to deduct specific applicable monthly
expenses under the National and Local Standards.98 Sub-section (iii)
allows a debtor to deduct from current monthly income “[t]he debtor’s
average monthly payment on account of secured debts [which] shall be
calculated as the sum of the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually
due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date
of the filing of the petition[.]”.99
At issue is the phrase “amounts scheduled as contractually due to
secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of the
petition . . . .”100 The question is whether the language in this phrase, when
considered within the context of the means test as a whole, creates a static
test: one that allows the deduction when there are amounts due to secured
creditors on the petition date irrespective of the intended surrender of the
collateral.101 Or, alternatively, whether it creates a dynamic or forwardlooking test: one that, by looking to the post-petition future, disallows the
expense when, although contractually bound to make payments to secured
creditors on the petition date, the debtor surrenders the collateral so that,
at some point in the future, that collateral may be sold thereby
extinguishing debtor’s contractual obligation to pay the claim.102
One of the earliest cases to interpret this statutory provision, In re
Walker, analyzed the phrase giving each word its plain ordinary

97

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
99
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (2012).
100
Id.
101
The two most commonly adopted approaches by bankruptcy courts are referred to as
the “snapshot approach” and the “future oriented” approach. The majority of cases reason
that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), the secured debt expense, was
meant to create a snapshot of the debtor’s finances as of the petition date and that the
bankruptcy court should not consider the debtor’s future intention except under a totality
of circumstances analysis. A minority of courts have adopted the “future oriented”
approach which allows debtor to claim only those secured debt expenses which the debtor
reasonably expects to pay post-petition. In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905, 910 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2009) (explaining split in authority and compiling authorities).
102
Id.
98
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meaning.103 In Walker, the debtors argued that they could deduct from their
current monthly income an amount equal to the payments due on their
primary residence, subject to a first and second mortgage, and one of their
vehicles, which was subject to a lien.104 The debtors asserted that the
statute’s plain language allowed them to deduct these payments despite
their intent to surrender the collateral because, on the petition date, they
were contractually obligated to make these payments in the sixty months
following the petition date.105 The United States Trustee contended that
the debtors should not be allowed to deduct the expense because, given
their intent to surrender the collateral, they would not actually be making
those payments post-petition.106
The court held that both the plain meaning of section
707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) and the text, structure, and context of the means test
compelled the conclusion that debtors could deduct the payments, despite
their intent to surrender the collateral, as they were legally obligated to
make those payments on the petition date.107 Turning first to the text of the
statute, the court noted that the word “scheduled” in the phrase “scheduled
as contractually due to secured creditors,” was commonly defined as “to
plan for a certain date,”108 while the phrase “as contractually due” referred
to a debtor’s legal obligation under contract law to make a payment in a
certain amount.109 The court concluded that the surrender of the collateral,
whether intended prospectively or already effected, did not change the fact
that, on the petition date, the payments were “contractually due” nor did it

103
In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125, at *3-4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May
1, 2006); see also In re Randle, No. 07C631, 2007 WL 2668727, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 20,
2007) (“The United States Supreme Court and our United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit have consistently instructed us lower courts to accord statutory terms or
words their ordinary, common meaning unless they are specifically defined by the statute
or statutory context requires a different definition.”); In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 860
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (stating that “[w]here the words in the statute are not defined
terms, the court should look to their ordinary, dictionary-defined meaning.”).
104
In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, at *1.
105
Id. at *2.
106
Id.
107
Id. at *4–6.
108
Id. at *3 (quoting Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1713 (2d ed. rev.
2001)).
109
In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, at *3 (“The common meaning of ‘as contractually
due’ is that the debtor is legally obligated under the contract, in this case, a promissory
note, to make a payment in a certain amount, with a certain amount of interest, for a set
number of months into the future. Accordingly, payments that are ‘scheduled as
contractually due’ are those payments that the debtor will be required to make on certain
dates in the future under the contract.”); In re Randle, No. 07C631, 2007 WL 2668727, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2007).
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eliminate the debtors’ contractual liability for the debt.110 Rejecting the
Trustee’s argument that this interpretation would give debtors a “free
pass” not intended by Congress by allowing the debtor to deduct the
expense without the attendant burden of having to make those payments
post-petition, the court stated: “[W]hether debtor passes or fails the means
test is relevant only to the question of whether the U.S. Trustee will benefit
from the presumption of abuse. In cases in which the presumption of abuse
does not arise or is rebutted, the U.S. Trustee may pursue dismissal of a
debtor’s case under section 707(b)(3), which provides that the court may
consider whether the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of the debtor’s
financial situation demonstrates abuse.”111
Similarly, in In re Ralston, the court undertook a step by step analysis
to arrive at the plain meaning of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I).112 Referring
to the dictionary definition of the word “schedule” or “scheduled,” the
court stated that the word means “to place or include in a schedule[,] to
make a schedule of [or] to plan for a certain time, while the word
“contractual” or “contractually” means “of or having the nature of
contract.”113 Together, the phrase “scheduled as contractually due” refers
to the “planned” payments that are scheduled to be due pursuant to
contract.114 The court noted that, in the statute, this language is followed
by the phrase “in each of the 60 months following the date of the petition.”
The court held that this phrase along with the subsequent language in the
statute “divided by 60” provided the court with guidance on how to
calculate the amount that debtor could deduct on the means test calculation
and did not call for a forward-looking analysis of the expense: “Taken
together, the meaning behind these provisions is . . . that the debtor will
only be allowed to deduct monthly an amount equal to the total of such
110
In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, at *4 (“When a debtor files the bankruptcy petition,
the debtor is contractually due for payments on the outstanding secured debts for the length
of the contract. The debtor’s contractual liability for the debt is not eliminated upon the
surrender of the collateral.”); see also In re Nockerts, 357 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
2006) (noting that “nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that scheduled
payments remain contractually due”); In re Randle, 2007 WL 2668727, at *7 (“The
debtor’s announced intent to surrender the property does not change the contractual
obligation owed by the debtor.”).
111
In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, at *8.
112
In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 862 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
113
Id. at 862 (quoting Webster’s New College Dictionary 1281(Michael Agnes ed.
2007)); see also United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2003) ([T]o
determine the common usage or ordinary meaning of a term, courts often turn to dictionary
definitions for guidance.”).
114
In re Ralston, 400 B.R. at 862-63; In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2012) (“Since a determination of the appropriate proceeding should be made as of the
petition date, a debtor’s deductions from income on the means test should also be
determined as of the petition date.”).
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payments on secured debt due during the 60 months following the date of
the petition, divided by sixty.115 According to the court, the plain meaning
of the statute calls for a snapshot of the debtor’s contractual secured debt
obligations on the date of the petition.116 Like the court in In re Walker,
the court in Ralston held that the debtor could take the expense when
payment is contractually due on the petition date and emphasized that,
while debtor’s contractual obligation may be extinguished at some point
in the process, it is not extinguished upon the filing of the Statement of
Intention.117 Because having an intent to surrender the property does not
have any legal effect on the nature of the debt, in order to take into account
the subsequent surrender of the collateral, the court would have to take
post-petition events into consideration.118 This, according to the court, is
incompatible with the nature of the means test in chapter 7 cases.119
After the decision of the court in In re Walker, the majority of courts
considering the issue have held that the language of the statute is clear, not
ambiguous, and that the plain meaning of the statutory text allows a debtor
to take a deduction for payments due to secured creditors on the petition
date despite indicating an intent to surrender the collateral on debtor’s
statement of intention.120 Moreover, a contextual analysis of section
707(b) that includes the additional abuse tests of section 707(b)(3), proves
that means testing in chapter 7 cases is incompatible with any
interpretation of the statute that selects a singular expense within the
115

In re Ralston, 400 B.R. at 862. The Ralston court provides the following example to
illustrate: “[I]f the debtor has a monthly secured debt payment of $600, but only 10
payments [contractually due on the petition date], the allowed deduction will be the total
of those payments, or $6,000, divided by 60. Thus, the debtor would only be allowed $100
monthly deduction on account of secured debt under this provision, despite the fact that
the actual monthly payment is $600.” Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 863.
118
Id.
119
Id. (“The Means Test, as a whole, as it is applied in a Chapter 7 case, has the character
of a mechanical formula that often relates very little to the actual financial circumstances
of the debtor.”).
120
See In re Navin, 526 B.R. 81 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015); In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 562
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012); In re Hardigan, No. 12-40484, 2012 WL 9703097 (Bankr. S.D.
Ga. Dec. 20, 2012); In re Grinkmeyer, 456 B.R. 385 (Bankr. S.D. Id. 2011); In re Sonntag,
No. 10-1749, 2011 WL 3902999 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Sept. 6, 2011); In re Ng, No. 1002001, 2011 WL 576067 (Bankr. D. Ha. Feb. 9, 2011); In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 173
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (recognizing the split of authority and stating that the “vast
majority of courts to consider this issue have concluded that the plain language of the
statute permits a chapter 7 debtor to deduct payments on secured debt even when the debtor
plans to surrender post-petition the collateral underlying the debt”); In re Haar, 360 B.R.
759, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that a debtor who surrenders secured property
is permitted to expense payments on that property when conducting the means test
calculation of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)).
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means test calculation for special forward-looking treatment–particularly
when there is no language in the statute that limits the availability of that
expense to debtors.121

B. A Mechanical Means Test Acquires a Forward-Looking
Element: The Trend Cases
It is well established that, in determining whether a chapter 7 case is
an abuse of the bankruptcy laws, post-petition changes to the debtor’s
income or expenses, including a reduction to debtor’s expenses resulting
from the surrender of collateral, must be considered using a totality of the
circumstances analysis pursuant to section 707(b)(3).122 In In re Denzin,
the bankruptcy court recognized that the chapter 7 means test is not
forward-looking and emphasized that Congress included “complementary
dynamic chapter 7 abuse test[s],” the section 707(b)(3) bad faith and
totality of the circumstances tests, that support the chapter 7 means test
and allow the court to look at debtor’s actual financial affairs and
surrounding circumstances.123 The court stated: “Together, they provide a
straight-forward, bright-line test, [section] 707(b)(2), supported by a
dynamic, customized test, [section] 707(b)(3). The first looks to a debtor’s
hypothetical budget; the second emphasizes the debtor’s actual budget.
Between the two of them, a debtor who should not be in chapter 7 should
be identified and redirected to chapter 13.”124
Notwithstanding, cases interpreting section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) post
Lanning and Ransom, or the “trend cases,” have increasingly denied
chapter 7 debtors the ability to deduct secured debt payments on the means
test when the debtor has indicated an intent to surrender the collateral post-

121

See In re Rivers, 466 B.R. at 567-70; In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 465 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2006); In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 316-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); In re Brady, 419
B.R. 479, 486 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2009).
122
In re Denzin, 534 B.R. 883, 887 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015) (“There is no language in
§ 707(b) that is forward-looking as there is in § 1325(b).”); In re Haman, 368 B.R. at 31618 (calculations under the means test are purposefully circumscribed and should not
include foreseeable circumstances; instead, such future circumstances are properly
considered under the totality analysis of section 707(b)(3)); In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16,
22 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (finding that the “consideration of postpetition developments in
the application of the means test would be contrary to Congressional intent as expressed in
the amendments to § 707(b)”); In re Singletary, 354 B.R. at 465 (“To allow a movant to
include the outcome of future events as part of the means test would eliminate the
distinction between the presumption of abuse test and the totality of the circumstances
test.”).
123
In re Denzin, 543 B.R. at 887.
124
Id.
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petition.125 Most bankruptcy courts that disallow the expense usually do
so relying on dicta from Hamilton or Ransom that is taken out of context
and not directly relevant to the interpretation of the statutory language of
section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).126 Instead, that dicta is relevant to the
interpretation of section 1325 of the Code and the manner in which the
bankruptcy court should arrive at a determination of a chapter 13 debtor’s
projected disposable income.127 Some use that language to impute
restrictions on the availability of the expense when the statute itself
contains no such limitations.128 Other courts deny the expense deduction
based simply on the overarching congressional purpose underlying
BAPCPA of making debtors repay creditors the maximum they can

125

See In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015); see also In re Hamilton,
513 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014); In re White, 512 B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
2014); In re Clary, No. 6:11-bk-04556-ABB, 2012 WL 868717 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14,
2012); In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 471 B.R.
540 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Krawczyk, No. 11-09596-8-JRL, 2012 WL 3069437
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 27, 2012); In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011);
In re Wilson, 454 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011).
126
See In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880-81; In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. at 135 (noting
that, when taken together, the most recent line of cases including Ransom and Lanning
“depart[] from the strict formulaic approach to the means test and take into account what
is likely to occur in the future”); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. at 550; In re Krawczyk, 2012
WL 3069437, at *4; In re Hamilton, 513 B.R. at 297-303. But see In re Hardigan, No. 1240484, 2012 WL 9703097, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2012) (stating that the holdings
in Lanning and Ransom did not overrule precedent that allowed debtors to deduct secured
debt expense despite surrender of collateral in chapter 7 case).
127
In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 564 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“Clearly, Lanning and
Ransom both arise in the context of Chapter 13 cases, and both involve a determination of
projected disposable income and the question of how much the debtors were required to
submit to their Chapter 13 Plans for payment to creditors.”); In re Grinkmeyer, 456 B.R.
385, 387-89 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2011) (finding that Lanning and Ransom are applicable to
chapter 13’s concept of projected disposable income, which does not exist in chapter 7,
and holding that a chapter 7 debtor may deduct mortgage payments on property he plans
to surrender); In re Johnson, 503 B.R. 447, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) (“[T]here is a
significant difference between chapter 13, where the goal is to pay creditors out of
projected disposable income, and chapter 7, where the goal is liquidation and discharge
and the court is not required to project debtor’s future resources.”).
128
See In re White, 512 B.R. at 829 (“In order to deduct payments on secured debt . . . a
debtor must intend to actually make the payments going forward . . . .”); In re Fredman,
471 B.R. at 550–51 (requiring that debtor show a secured payment arising out of a
contractual relationship that is due and being paid post-petition); In re Krawczyk, 2012
WL 3069437, at *5 (stating that “despite the language of the statute, courts are to look at
what is actually happening in these transactions and calculate deductions based on the
debtor’s actual expenses”); In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880 (stating that “‘a debtor should
be required to qualify for a deduction by actually incurring an expense in the relevant
category’”) (quoting Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 725).
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afford.129 Finally, some bankruptcy courts mistakenly assume that an
indication by the debtor that collateral will be surrendered, or the postpetition surrender of collateral itself, has the effect of extinguishing the
underlying obligation thereby making the expense inapplicable to the
debtor.130 As a general rule, therefore, these courts refuse chapter 7 debtors
the ability to claim the secured debt expense by comparing two very
different sections of the bankruptcy code, section 707(b)(2) and section
1325, and treating those sections as if they were wholly interchangeable–
essentially comparing apples and oranges.
These interpretations of the secured debt expense statute are not only
strained, but unnecessary given that, in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases,
Congress has already provided a mechanism that allows for the court to
consider actual or probable post-petition changes to debtor’s finances–the
section 707(b)(3) totality of circumstances analysis.131
In one of the first cases to address the issue after Lanning and Ransom,
the bankruptcy court in In re Thompson denied the debtors, a husband and
wife, the ability to deduct from their means test calculation mortgage
payments due on their primary residence. 132 The debtors had surrendered
the home, but deducted an amount equal to the average of the mortgage
payments due on the home for the sixty months following the petition
date.133 The trustee sought to dismiss the debtors’ chapter 7 case on the
grounds of presumed abuse, under section 707(b)(1) and, alternatively,
pursuant to section 707(b)(3).134 The bankruptcy court agreed with the
trustee and dismissed the debtors’ case for presumed abuse holding that
129

In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212-13 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015) (quoting Ransom, 562
U.S. at 71); see In re Hamilton, 513 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014); In re White, 512
B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014); In re Clary, No. 6:11-bk-04556-ABB, 2012 WL
868717 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012); In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Krawczyk,
2012 WL 3069437; In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Wilson,
454 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011).
130
See In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015); In re Thompson, 457
B.R. 872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
131
In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16, 21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (“Congress did not remove the
ability of bankruptcy courts to consider circumstances, including postpetition [sic]
developments, in determining abuse . . . Congress expressly incorporated the formerly
judicially created totality of the circumstances test which permits consideration of
circumstances both preceding and following the filing of the petition.”); see also In re
Perrotta, 390 B.R. 26, 30-31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008).
132
See In re Thompson, 457 B.R.at 877, 880.
133
The debtors argued that they were entitled to list the payments on loans secured by
the residence because those payments were contractually due to secured creditors in each
of the 60 months following the date of the bankruptcy petition notwithstanding the
surrender of the property. The debtors conceded that, without the deductions for the
mortgage payments, the presumption of abuse arose. Id. at 875, 876-77.
134
Id. at 874-75.
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the debtors could not deduct from the means test calculation any secured
debt payments owed on the residence that the debtors had surrendered.135
Without focusing on the statutory language of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii),
the bankruptcy court in Thompson held that debtors could not deduct the
mortgage expense because these were not “actually-incurred expenses”
given that the property had been surrendered and debtors would not be
making payments on that loan post-petition.136 The court reasoned that
debtors had to “qualify” for the expense by actually incurring it in order to
deduct the secured debt payment from the means test.137 To support its
reasoning, the court in Thompson directly quotes Ransom stating:
“Because Congress intended the means test to approximate the debtor’s
reasonable expenditures on essential items, a debtor should be required to
qualify for a deduction by actually incurring an expense in the relevant
category.”138 The court in Thompson fails to recognize, however, that
Congress intended the means test to approximate the debtor’s reasonable
expenditures in chapter 13 cases where it specifically made the means test
calculation the mechanism for determining the reasonable expenditures for
above-median debtors.139 That statutory language, present in section 1325,
is notably absent from section 707(b) and not relevant to the means test
calculation as it functions in chapter 7 cases.140 Even assuming that
Congress did indeed intend the expenses in section 707(b) to approximate
reasonable expenses for chapter 7 debtors as well, the court’s
interpretation of the secured debt expense statute in Thompson is
misguided. Unlike in Ransom, where the expense statute at issue allowed
the debtor to claim only the “debtor’s applicable monthly expense
amounts under . . . the National Standards and Local Standards . . . “
(emphasis added),141 the expense statute before the court in Thompson, the
secured debt expense, has no such limitation in the statutory text as section
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) does not require the expense to be “applicable” or
“actually-incurred” to entitle debtor to claim it.142
In In re Fredman, the bankruptcy court held that debtors could not
deduct from their means test calculation mortgage payments for a home
that the debtors indicated on their statement of intention would be
surrendered.143 Dismissing the debtor’s chapter 7 case for presumed abuse
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 877, 880-81.
Id.
Id. at 880 (quoting Ransom, 562 U.S. at70-71).
In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880 (quoting Ransom, 562 U.S. at 70-71).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325; see also infra Part II(B)-(C).
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325; § 707(b).
Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65–66.
In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 879–80.
In re Fredman, 471 B.R. at 555.
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the court stated that the debtors could not deduct “phantom” secured debt
payments from their means test calculation when debtors would not
actually be making those payments post-petition.144 Relying on the Court’s
language in Hamilton v. Lanning the court stated: “[I]f a debtor’s decision
to surrender secured property is ‘known or virtually certain,’ that
information should be taken into account.”145 In so holding, however, the
court did not consider nor address why such post-petition changes to
debtor’s expenses would not be considered pursuant to section 707(b)(3)’s
totality of the circumstances analysis.
Similarly, in In re Krawezyk, debtors were not allowed to take the
secured debt expense for properties they owned that were subject to
mortgages.146 In finding that the means test calculation triggered a
presumption of abuse in the debtor’s chapter 7 case the bankruptcy court
stated: “[D]espite the language of the statute, courts are to look at what is
actually happening in these transactions and calculate deductions based on
the debtor’s actual expenses.”147 The court noted that the most recent line
of cases, referring to the Court’s opinion in Lanning and Ransom,
prohibited a debtor from deducting “phantom expenses to shelter
income.”148 The court failed to acknowledge or attempt to reconcile its
holding or its rationale with the fact that the majority of expenses deducted
from CMI on the means test do not reflect the debtor’s “actual expenses”
or the reality of debtor’s finances.
The bankruptcy courts’ analysis of the secured debt expense in these
cases, and other trend cases following this logic, is seriously flawed for
several reasons. First, although the United States Supreme Court has stated
that the first point of focus when construing a statute must be the statutory
language, the courts’ opinions in these cases show that little attention is
given to the statutory language when interpreting the secured debt expense
statute.149 In Thompson, for example, the court appears to initially focus
144

Id. (stating that “[w]here there is no actual cost reflected on the bankruptcy schedules,
since the debtor is surrendering the property and not paying the debt, that fact must be
recognized and the phantom payment excluded from the calculation of ‘average monthly
payments on account of secured debts.’”).
145
Id. at 551.
146
In re Krawczyk, No. 11-09596-8-JRL, 2012 WL 3069437 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 27,
2012);
147
Id. at *5.
148
Id.
149
See, e.g., In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015); In re Hamilton,
513 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014); In re White, 512 B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
2014); In re Clary, No. 6:11-bk-04556-ABB, 2012 WL 868717 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012);
In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 472 B.R. 540
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Krawczyk, 2012 WL 3069437; In re Thompson, 457 B.R.
872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Wilson, 454 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011).
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on construing the language of the statute but, in reality, concentrates on
the phrase “actually-incurred expense,” a term that does not appear
anywhere in the text of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).150 As a result, the
bankruptcy court denies the debtors the ability to deduct the mortgage
payments from their chapter 7 means test based on a phrase borrowed from
the Court’s opinion in Ransom, a case where the United States Supreme
Court interprets a different expense statute and one that is wholly
irrelevant to the applicability of the secured debt expense in section
707(b)(2)(A)(iii).151 Notably, the court in Thompson does not cite
authority, binding or otherwise, to support its reliance on the phrase
“actually-incurred expense.”152 Presumably, as the court cites the Ransom
case later in its opinion, the court relies on the language from Ransom
where the Court interprets section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), a different expense
statute that allows the debtor to deduct “debtor’s applicable monthly
expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local
Standards” (emphasis added).153 In interpreting that language, the Court in
Ransom holds that to be considered an “applicable monthly expense,”
debtor must qualify for that deduction by “actually incurring an expense
in the relevant category.”154 However, in imputing that requirement into
its interpretation of the secured debt expense, the court in Thompson fails
to recognize or explain that the statutory text of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)
does not contain the word “applicable” nor the phrase “actually-incurred
expense.”155 Several cases decided after Thompson have followed its lead
denying chapter 7 debtors the ability to claim the secured debt expense and
citing the case as support for its own analysis requiring that debtor actually
incurs the secured debt payment post-petition to qualify for the expense.156

150

In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 877 (stating that “The payments on loans secured by
the . . . [p]roperty are not actually incurred expenses and do not meet the statutory
definition of ‘payments on account of secured debts.’”).
151
Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65-66 (basing the interpretation of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) on the
presence of the phrase “debtor’s applicable monthly expenses”).
152
In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880.
153
See infra Part II.
154
Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65-66; see also In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880.
155
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii); see In re Navin, 526 B.R. 81, 85 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2015) (highlighting the distinction in language between § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii)); In re
Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 173 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“There is no conditional language
in section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) that requires that a debtor must intend to continue to pay the
contractually due amounts in order to claim the expense.”).
156
See In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212-13, 215 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015); see also In re
Hamilton, 513 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014); see also In re White, 512 B.R. 822
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014); see also In re Clary, No. 6:11-bk-04556-ABB, 2012 WL 868717
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012); see also In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 2012); see also In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); see also In
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A second flaw in these trend cases is that the bankruptcy courts do not
account for the fact that, where Congress intended that the court consider
the debtor’s “actual monthly expenses” in the means test it expressly stated
so in the statute.157 A cardinal principle of statutory construction is that
Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says.”158 In section 707(b) of the bankruptcy code, Congress uses the
phrase “actual monthly expenses” or “actual expenses” five times;
thereby, directing a debtor to deduct from his CMI only the actual amount
spent on specific items or services.159 For example, in subsection
(2)(A)(ii)(I), the debtor is directed to deduct his “actual monthly expenses
for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses.”160 In subsection
(II), Congress directs a debtor to claim “the continuation of actual
expenses paid by the debtor that are reasonable and necessary for the
support of an elderly, chronically ill, or disabled household
member . . . .”161 Notably, the phrase “actual expenses” is used in
subsections (I), (II), (III), (IV), and (V) of section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii); yet,
the phrase is markedly absent from the very next subsection, subsection
(iii), the portion of the statute that provides for the deduction of secured
debt payments.162 There is no conditional language in section
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) that requires that a debtor must intend to continue to pay
the contractually due amounts in order to claim the expense.163
Moreover, where Congress intended to limit the deduction of those
expenses to only those that are “reasonable” or “necessary,” it again
expressly incorporated that limitation into the statutory language.164 The
text of the secured debt expense statute, section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the
bankruptcy code, is close in proximity to each of these statutory
provisions. Notably, however, the terms “actual monthly expense,” “actual
expense,” and “reasonably necessary” are absent from the language of that
statute.165 This shows that had Congress wanted to limit the applicability
of the secured debt expense to only those debtors that would actually be
making payments on the secured debt post-petition, it could have easily
re Krawczyk, No. 11-09596-8-JRL, 2012 WL 3069437 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 27, 2012);
see also In re Wilson, 454 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011).
157
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), (II), (III), (IV), (V).
158
Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
159
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), (II), (III), (IV), (V).
160
The bankruptcy code states that “Other Necessary Expenses” includes “reasonably
necessary health insurance, disability insurance, and health savings expenses for the debtor,
the spouse of the debtor, or the dependents of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
161
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(2016).
162
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(2016).
163
In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 174 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009).
164
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2016).
165
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(2016).
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and clearly stated that requirement in the text of the statute. Congress
chose not to limit the applicability of the secured debt expense statute in
this manner; accordingly, bankruptcy courts should not impute such
limitations in an attempt to fix a perceived error in the means test or to
better achieve some congressional purpose.166
Finally, when one considers the broader context within which the
secured debt expense statute exists in section 707(b), it becomes clear that
bankruptcy courts’ reliance on the dicta of both Hamilton v. Lanning and
Ransom v. FIA Card Services is misplaced in chapter 7 cases. A concern
that features prominently in most of the trend cases, and that could be
called the driving force behind the courts’ decisions to deny chapter 7
debtors the benefit of the expense, is the apprehension that allowing the
deduction would frustrate the legislative intent underlying the BAPCPA
amendments and means testing generally; the Congressional dictate that
debtors should be forced to pay creditors the maximum they can afford.167
In short, bankruptcy courts are concerned that allowing the debtor to
deduct secured debt payments that debtor will not in reality be making
post-petition essentially permits him to pull one over on his creditors by
enabling debtor to bypass the means test without being caught for abuse.168
In Fredman, for example, the court noted that allowing debtors to deduct
fictitious monthly payments would be senseless and contrary to the intent
of Congress.169 Other courts have referred to this type of expense as
“phantom expenses” and have stated that allowing a debtor to deduct such
expenses has the potential of “turning a debtor’s fresh start into a free

166

Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the
Means Test the Only Way, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 678 (2005) (disagreeing
with the argument that a judge who thinks the means test is not effective may fix it by
substituting his or her own more stringent standards of ability to pay).
167
Ransom, 562 U.S. at 725; In re Johnson, 454 B.R. 882, 889 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)
(“[T]he means test must be applied in light of the debtor’s actual circumstances . . . to give
effect to its purpose – that is, that debtors who can afford to pay their creditors should pay
their creditors.”); In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872, 880 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“Allowing
debtors to claim expenses they will not actually pay frustrates legislative intent and creates
an inaccurate picture of their financial reality.”); In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131, 135
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012) (noting that not allowing the deduction of a secured debt payment,
that will not in reality be made in the future, furthers the purpose of the means test which
was intended to ensure that those who can afford to repay some portion of their unsecured
debt be required to do so); In re Krawczyk, 2012 WL 3069437, at *5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
July 27, 2012) (“Essentially, the more recent line of case law prohibits a debtor from
deducting phantom expenses to shelter income.”).
168
See generally Johnson, 454 B.R. at 889; In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880-81; In re
Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. at 135-36; In re Fredman, 471 B.R. at 540, 555; In re Krawczyk,
2012 WL 3069437, at *4-5.
169
In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 555.
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pass.”170 Yet other courts have highlighted that applying Ransom and
Lanning in chapter 7 cases will give the means test a more real-world view
as opposed to having the calculation yield a hypothetical or unrealistic
result.171 This interpretation of the secured debt expense, however, takes
too narrow of a view of the statute and fails to consider the entirety of the
dismissal statute in chapter 7 consumer cases. The United States Supreme
Court has stressed that statutory construction must be a holistic
endeavor.172 In interpreting one part of a statute, a court must look to the
provisions of the whole law and must also consider the object of the law
and its policy.173 In interpreting the means test and each of its parts,
therefore, a court must look at the entire statutory structure of section
707(b) and consider, not only the purpose behind Congress’s enactment of
BAPCPA or means testing generally, but also give due import to each part
of the statute.174
When section 707(b) of the bankruptcy code is analyzed as a whole, it
becomes apparent that no such danger exists in chapter 7 cases.175 In
section 707(b)(3), Congress specifically provided a second test designed
to allow the bankruptcy court to consider post-petition changes to debtor’s
income or expenses that impact the debtor’s capacity to pay creditors.176 It
is through the section 707(b)(3) totality of the circumstances or bad faith
test that post-petition fluctuations in debtor’s finances must be considered
in chapter 7 cases; not through piece-meal adjustments by the bankruptcy
court of the monetary income and expenses figures reported on the means
test calculation.177 In cases where the debtor is not subject to the means
test, passes the means test, or effectively rebuts the presumption of abuse,
a debtor’s chapter 7 case may still be dismissed for abuse where the case
was filed in bad faith or where a totality of circumstances demonstrate that
debtor is able to pay some or all of his debts.178 This second test, looks at
the chapter 7 debtor’s actual post-petition income and expenses, as well as
170

In re White, 512 B.R. 822, 830 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014); In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207,
210-13 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015).
171
In re Campbell, No. 15-13426-BFK, 2016 WL 4150663, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug.
3, 2016).
172
See generally Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.”).
173
See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506 (2000) (stating that terms in a statute should
not be construed so as to render any provision of that statute meaningless or superfluous).
174
Id.
175
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West 2018).
176
Id.
177
See generally In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
178
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3) (West 2018).
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other factors, and whether debtor’s actual or real financial circumstances
show that debtor has the ability to pay creditors.179
In In re Haar, for example, the bankruptcy court held that income
made available to the debtors post-petition as a result of the surrender of
their residence, must be considered to determine whether a totality of
circumstances showed that debtors had the capacity to repay creditors.180
Debtors, a husband and wife, had deducted as an expense on their means
test mortgage payments due on their residence on the petition date.181 The
court stated that the debtor’s ability to repay a meaningful portion of their
unsecured debt is a prime consideration in a totality of the circumstances
analysis under section 707(b)(3).182 The court held that because the
surrender of debtor’s residence provided the debtors with an additional
$1,200 per month of additional income, the totality of debtor’s finances
indicated that debtors could pay at least some of their debt in a Chapter 13
Plan.183
By comparison, chapter 13 or, more specifically, section 1325 does
not have a statutory provision comparable to section 707(b)(3) in place nor
was that portion of section 707 selected by Congress for inclusion into
section 1325 of the bankruptcy code.184 Accordingly, in a chapter 13 case,
in order for the bankruptcy court to accurately determine how much of the
debtor’s disposable income debtor can pay to unsecured creditors over a
five year plan, the court must take into account, as Hamilton v. Lanning
holds, changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or
virtually certain on the petition date.185 Otherwise, employing a strictly
mechanical approach to determine projected disposable income could
deny creditors payments that the debtor could easily make in cases where
debtor’s income is higher during the post-petition plan period than it was
on the petition date.186
179

In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 564 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012); In re Perelman, 419 B.R.
168, 173 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905, 911 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2009).
180
In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
181
In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 497 (in addition, debtors had deducted an amount equal to
their monthly payments for real estate taxes on the property).
182
Id. at 498.
183
In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 500; see also In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 173 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the debtor could take the secured debt deductions on his
means test despite his intention to surrender the collateral, but that the fact that the debtor
was not making payments on the secured debts could be considered by the court under
section 707(b)(3)).
184
11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West 2018).
185
Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 509.
186
Id. at 519 (agreeing with the United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit’s
opinion that “a court taking the forward-looking approach should begin by calculating
disposable income . . . It is only in unusual cases that a court may go further and take into
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The fact that section 1325 of the bankruptcy code incorporates by
reference the means test calculation for the purpose of determining a
debtor’s disposable income and that the United States Supreme Court has
held that, in certain limited chapter 13 cases, a bankruptcy court must
account for changes in the debtor’s finances that are known on the petition
date does not, by extension, give rise to the inference that the secured debt
expense should be given a forward-looking application in chapter 7 cases.
Just as post-petition changes to a debtor’s income are not considered in
chapter 7 cases by simply having a bankruptcy court adjust the debtor’s
CMI on the section 707(b)(2) means test, neither should post-petition
changes to debtor’s expenses be accounted for in this manner. In chapter
7 cases, Congress provided and built into the dismissal statute the
exclusive mechanism through which post-petition changes to the debtor’s
finances must be considered–the additional abuse tests of section
707(b)(3).

IV.

CONCLUSION

Careful analysis of the statutory text of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I)
shows that the language of the statute is clear. Its plain meaning allows a
debtor the benefit of the secured debt expense in chapter 7 bankruptcy
cases irrespective of debtor’s intent to surrender the collateral postpetition.187 Moreover, a contextual analysis of section 707(b) proves that
means testing in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases is incompatible with the
forward looking or reality based application increasingly being given to
the statute by some bankruptcy courts. Having anticipated that the results
of the means testing in chapter 7 cases may not always accurately reflect
debtor’s real repayment capacity, Congress provided additional
mechanisms, specifically the totality of the circumstances and bad faith
tests of section 707(b)(3), through which the United States Trustee could
look beyond the numbers in the means test calculation to assess debtor’s
real finances and more accurately gauge debtor’s ability to pay
creditors.188 The inclusion of these tests in section 707 allows bankruptcy
courts to more aptly use its judicial discretion to assess the reality of
debtor’s financial situation and its impact on debtor’s ability to pay.189

account other known or virtually certain information about the debtor’s future income or
expenses.”).
187
See In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 860-61 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Almost every court
that has addressed this statute has determined that it is not ambiguous.”).
188
See In re Denzin, 534 B.R. at 886-87.
189
In re Perrotta, 390 B.R. 26, 30-31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008); In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16,
21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007).
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When viewed as a whole, the structure of section 707(b) clearly
conveys congress’s intent to create three separate and distinct tests for
abuse in chapter 7 cases: The means test, which directs a court to presume
that abuse exists when debtor’s disposable income is above the statutory
threshold; the totality of circumstances test, pursuant to which a court may
dismiss debtor’s case for abuse when the facts of the case show debtor’s
ability to pay his debts; and a bad faith test pursuant to which a court may
dismiss a bankruptcy case for abuse when there is evidence that a debtor
has manipulated the bankruptcy process in some illicit way including
evidence that debtor has tried to maliciously thwart a creditor’s efforts to
collect on a debt.190 When the statutory structure of chapter 7’s dismissal
provision is considered as a whole, it becomes clear that allowing a debtor
the benefit of the secured debt expense on the means test calculation even
when that expense will not be actually incurred post-petition does not give
debtor a free pass or allow the debtor to impermissibly game the system.
Instead, it allows the means test calculation to be used by the bankruptcy
courts as Congress intended: as a screening mechanism to determine
whether a chapter 7 proceeding is appropriate on the petition date, while
holding the United States Trustee to his evidentiary burden of having to
prove abuse through a totality of circumstances analysis where factors
outside of the means test calculation, such as post-petition changes in
debtor’s income or expenses, indicate that debtor may have the ability to
pay some or all of his debts.191
Furthermore, bankruptcy courts need not disregard congressional
intent when interpreting the dismissal provision applicable to chapter 7
cases; courts need only consider the statute in its entirety giving due import
to each of the abuse tests created by Congress to ensure that, while debtors
pay the maximum they can afford, honest debtors are afforded access to
the bankruptcy protection they seek. When this is done, the apparent
190

In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (“As its introductory language
imparts, [section] 707(b)(3) is a subordinate paragraph, utilized when determining whether
a case should be dismissed under [section] 707(b)(1), the primary provision governing
dismissal. In this way, [section] 707(b)(3) is but one of two subordinate paragraphs used
to determine whether a case should be dismissed for abuse pursuant to [section] 707(b)(1).
The other, contained in [section] 707(b)(2), sets forth a formulaic approach, known as the
‘means test,’ whereby a court is directed to presume that abuse exists if an ability to pay
threshold is met.”); In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 567 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he Means
Test is only the first step of a two-tiered inquiry under [section] 707(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, and the two-tiered process shows that a debtor’s deductions on the Means Test
should be determined as of the petition date.”).
191
See generally In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“Since a
determination of the appropriate proceeding should be made as of the petition date, a
debtor’s deductions from income on the means test should also be determined as of the
petition date.”).
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incongruity between the statutory language of the chapter 7 dismissal
statute and the congressional intent of ensuring that debtors that can afford
to pay their debts do so, disappears.

